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Injection or Rejection
The Right to Refuse Psychotropic Drugs
By Hoard Berger
In the early 1950's, a group of scientists
discovered that tranquilizing compounds such a
thorazine, could be highly effective in controlling
psychiatric disorders. The immediate effect of this
discovery was the addition of a new weapon to the
medical arsenal combatting mental illness. Yet, in
the course of the next three decades, as the use of
pharmacotherapy increased dramatically, so, too, did
suspicion that beneath the track-marked surface lay
neglected fundamental liberties and human dignity
reeling in a chemically-induced darkness. Law and
psychiatry soon found themselves moving inevitably on
a collision course.
One of the issues that has helped to draw
battle lines is the question of whether civilly
committed mental patients have a constitutional right
to refuse treatment, and more specifically, the right
to refuse psychotropic medication. The clash
continues today, and though the trend appears to be
toward recognition of such a right, it is by no means
the law of the land. The issue pits judicial
rationality against clinical reality, and presents
two diametrically distinct conceptions of "freedom."
The legal arguments derive, for the most part,
from the individual's right to be free from
unnecessary and unwarranted governmental intrusions
upon one's person, including freedom from any kind of
'"ind control" via medication. But this argument is
at loggerheads with the view of much of the
psychiatric profession, who consider this notion "a
cruel joke unwittingly perpetrated by clinically
untutored persons." To the psychiatrist, those who
suffer from mental illness are human beings '"whose
action and thinking are significantly governed by
irrational, seemingly illogical, and inconsistent
forces." Such "irrational forces" render meaningless
the legal concept of "freedom." Instead, the medical
profession argues that 'the real "freedom" they are
attempting to bequeath upon their mentally ill
patients is the "freedom from the fetters of
unconscious conflicts, self-doubts, unrealistic
phobias, incapacitating anger, anxiety, delusions,
and hallucinatory experiences" - what they call the
'"nique and individual prisons rarely discussed in
debates on constitutional law in regard to mental
health." (Shewd, Protecting the Rights of the
Mentally Ill, 64 AB.A.J. 564 (1978).
Ifuch of one's perspective in this matter seems
to depend on how one views the psychiatric
profession Either it is seen as a group of truly
dedicated, sensitive individuals with the best
interests of their patients always their first
priority, or as 'hot-so-benign jail keepers" assuming
the role of society's agent for social control.
Perhaps the truth lies somewhere in between.
Clearly, though, some observers do believe that the
question of the right to refuse treatment ultimately
reveals a growing lack of credibility in the
methodology and practices of the psychiatric
profession.
The controversy also reflects some hard
thinking about the nature of the risks involved in
pharmacotherapy, and about who, in fact, should be
bearing them. A treatment program without drugs, for
instance, may result in longer institutionalization,
creating a greater financial burden upon the state.
But what of the risk of permanent disability
associated with the administration, over extendeji
periods of time, of drugs such as the majpS
tranquilizers, known to produce the condition
referred to as "tardive dyskinesia?" (See below)
Who should bear the risk of such treatment -__the
patient? the psychiatrist? society? These critical
questions are only now being addressed, and at
present, ,the answers remain embryonic.
A fundamental concern which pervades any
consideration of the right to refuse treatment lies
in the definition of 'treatment' itself. A major
objective of all recent litigation in this area has
been to expose the institutional abuse of the concept
of 'treatment' - an abuse which has often enlargei
the scope of the term to include punishment a$l
behavior control The cases, as a whole, have sough
to accomplish three things: first, to prohibit th*
use of intrusive treatment as a means of punishment
under any circumstances; second, to prohibit
treatment as a means of behavior control except in
clearly warranted exigent situations; and third, -to
establish, in non-emergency circumstances, za
constitutional right to refuse treatment for
competent as well as incompetent mental patients, the
latter's protection safeguarded by concepts closely
resembling the doctrine of substituted consent.
The Drugs
Of the six general categories of psychotropic
(mind-altering) medications, the most intrusive drugs
are considered to be the Major Tranquilizers (alqp
known as antipsychotics or neuroleptics). This group
of drugs is the most frequently prescribed for
treatment of mental disorder, and prooduces the most
profound neurological reaction when administere4.
Drugs included in this class are Thorazine, Mellaril,
Stelazine, Trilafon, Prolixin, Haldol, and Navang.
The major tranquilizers are regularly used in t1e
treatment of schizophrenia and have the effect of
significantly influencing chemical signals to t4e
brain. The net result is a dramatic decrease in bo- h
mental an physical activity. ,11
The possible side effects caused by this clars
of drugs fall into two groups: those that a p
temporary and reversible, and those that are
presently considered pqrmanently disabling. Of t!he
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first group, "extrapyramidal" effects are the most
common. These are neurological reactions including
spasms of the neck, back, face and eye muscles known
as dystonia; excessive tension, insomnia and general
restlessness called akathesia; and tremors, drooling,
shuffling walk and muscle stiffness termed
Parkinsonisms. Other side effects can include
lowered sex drive, dizziness, incoherency, reduction
in white blood cell count, constipation, blurred
vision, depression, false positive pregnancy tests,
and urinary complications. In addition, grand meal
seizures can occur, leading to loss of consciousness.
Severe reaction to antipsychotic drug therapy has





The prolonged use of antipsychotic drug
treatment can lead to the irreversible condition
known as tardive dyskinesia. The syptoms of this
condition, caused by damage to the basal ganglia in
the brain, include bizarre involuntary motor
movements of the tongue, face, lips, fingers, hands,
legs, and pelvis. Patients suffering from this
,chronic condition also face the possibility of
developing non-tumorous enlargement of the tongue and
ulcerations of the mouth, a well as extreme
difficulty in breathing and swallowing, in the
disease's most advanced stages.
The incidence of tardive dyskinesia among
institutionalized schizophrenics is not limited to a
relative few. Conservative estimates suggest that
thirty to fifty per cent of all patients treated with
antipsychotic drugs over a several year period suffer
from the disease. Other studies have put that figure
at fifty to sixty per cent. Science has yet to
perfect a cure for tardive dyskinesia. However,
there is an evolving school of psychiatric thought
which believes that the risk of permanent impairment
may be significantly lessened where a regimen of
strict monitoring of the beneficial and adverse
effects of the drugs, plus a systematic dosage
reduction is implemented.
The other categories of psychotropic
medications include: 1) the Antiparkinsenian drugs
(employed to neutralize the profound effects of the
major tranquilizers); 2) Lithium Carbonate; 3) the
antidepressant drugs (including amphetamines and
tricyclics); 4) the minor tranquilizers (antianxiety
drugs such as Librium and Valium); and 5) sleeping
,pills. Although the risk of permanent side effects
is generally not associated with the administration
of the drugs in these groups, a vast array of serious
temporary side effects for each class of drugs has
been documented.
Two Receat Decisions
Though the Supreme Court has yet to speak in
this area, two federal district courts have
considered on the merits the question whether there
exists a constitutional right to refuse psychotropic
medication. Rogers v. Okin. 478 F. Supp. 1342 (D.
Mass. 1979), and Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131
(DMNJ. 1978) represent the first serious attempts to
carve out this new constitutional right.
Rogers v. Cldn
Rubie Roers and the five other named
plaintiffs in this class action were all at one time
either voluntarily or involuntarily committed
inpatients at the May and Austin Units of the Boston
State Hospital, a Massachusetts institution for the
mentally ilL The action was brought pursuant to the
Civil Rights Act (42 U.S.C. §1983) alleging, among
other things, deprivation of plaintiffs'
constitutional rights resulting from defendant
institution supervisors' policies of forced
medication with powerful drugs. Seeking permanent
injunctive relief and money damages, plaintiffs
asserted a constitutional right to refuse treatment
based on the first, fourth, eight, and ninth
amendments, as guaranteed by the Due Process Clause
of the fourteenth amendment.
The plaintiffs in Rogers were not disputing the
institution's right to forcibly administer powerful
drugs in an emergency. Their complaint centered
squarely around defendants' policy of forced
medication absent these compelling circumstances.
Underlying the complaint, then, was the tacit
recognition of the qualified nature of the right
being asserted.
Narrowing the scope of its analysis, the Epaers
court examined only those claims based on the right
of privacy and the first amendment.
le Privacy Right: It was the defendants' contention
that plaintiffs' '"nterest" in refusing psychotropic
medication was not a cognizable right fundamental to
the concept of ordered liberty, and was, therefore
unprotected. Declaring that "common sense dictate(d)
a contrary conclusion," the court rejected this
argument. The court could not accept the assertion
that while the right to protect or dispose of one's
property was considered a fundamental liberty, the
right to refuse intrusive medication was not. In its
findings of fact, the court had recognized the
potentially dangerous and mind-altering nature of
psychotropic medication. Reiterating the essence of
its findings, the court then stated emphatically:
'Such rights (in the protection and disposition
of property) pale in comparison to the ultimate
decision as to whether to accept or refuse
psychotropic medication-medication that may or
may not cause unpleasant and unwarranted side
effects. The right to make such a decision is
basic to any right of privacy."
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Defendants argued further that the voluntarily
committed mental patient, having institutionalized
himself of his own free will, bad implicitly agreed
to accept the Hospital's treatment program, whatever
that might entail. In other words, that such
individuals had waived any right to refuse treatment
based on the contract/application they had signed
prior to admission. The application stated: "I
understand that during my hospitalization and, any
after care, I will be given treatment which may
include the injection of medicines." i
Again, the court rejected the argument,
proclaiming that there could be no distinction
between the rights of involuntary or voluntary mental
patients in refusing psychotropic medication in non-
emergencies. The language of the application, said
the court, failed to satisfy the standard of 'knowing
and intelligent waiver" set forth in Johnson v.
Zerbst 304 U.S 458 (1938). The court called the
language 'ambiguous, at best," and stated that "it
could even be interpreted as mere statement of
expectation or entitlement by the patient."
The First Aaendment: The court recognized,
initially, the intimate association between the first
amendment and the right of privacy in the deprivation
of the fundamental right to generate ideas. The
court stated: "The power to produce ideas is
fundamental to our cherished right to communicate and
is entitled to comparable constitutional protectio."
The court also said that despite the fact that mind
control in mental institutions was an accepted
medical practice, that such practice could not, of
itself, warrant "an unsanctioned intrusion on the
integrity of a human being." It declared that the
public interest was served by the fact of commitment
of mentally disturbed persons, but that such
commitment did not deprive such individuals of the
right to be wrong about treatment decisions, or of
"the right to be unwise," as long as "the
consequences of such error do not pose a danger of
physical harm to himself, fellow patients or hospital
staff." The Rogers court thus found "...a
fundamental right to decide to be left alone, absent
an emergency situation."
The court then turned to an ekamination of the
state's interest in forced medication in non-
emergencies. The court began its analysis by citing
the litany that no constitutional right is absolute;
that it is subject to and may be subordinated by a
compelling state interest. But the court found no
such compelling state interest in the forced
medication of patients in non-emergency situations.
Unlike in an emergency, said the court, the hospital
community is in no danger. And since the patient has
already been quarantined by commitment, forcible
injection is unnecessary to protect the general
public. Therefore, the police power of the state
provided no rationale for forced treatment in non-
emergencies.
The alternative rationale left to the state;
then, is its parens patriae power-enabling it to
take those actions needed to help those who are
incapable of caring for themselves. But the privacy
right, said the court, guarantees ".the freedom to
decide whether we want to be helped, or whether we
want to be left alone." The court called forcible
medication in nor-emergencies a "classic' intrusion
which was not justified under the circumstances.
An amicus brief filed by the Massachusetts




Psychiatric Society argued that the prohibition on
forced medication would leave hospital staffs "caught
in a situation of having a legal obligation which
they cannot carry out." But the court disspelled
this assertion, declaring that: "The state hasa
duty to make treatment available. It hasno duty, t
impose treatment on a competent involuntary patient
who prefers to refuse medication, regardless of its
potential benefit." The court thus disavowed the
narens patriae rationale as a justification for
forced medication in non-emergencies.
The state argued further that their legitimate
interest in decreasing both the number of
hospitalized patients, and their respective lengths
of stay was sufficiently compelling to stand up
against plaintiffs' claims. While acknowledging this
interest as important, the court, nonetheless,
refused to accept factors such as cost and
convenience as legitimate justifications for the
denial of constitutional rights. -The court then
issued an order enjoining defendants from forcibly
medicating voluntary or involuntary mental patients
in all non-emergency circumstances.
How then, did the Roge- court define ag
"emergency?' Defendants urged the court to recognize
the term 'sychiatric emergency" as the appropriate
standard to e employed. Such a term was seen to
include any behavior ranging from mock or real
suicide gestures to "acute or chronic emotional
disturbance having the potential to seriously
interfere with the patient's ability to function on a
daily basis." The court rejected this definition Out
of hand as being "..too broad, subjedtive, and
unwieldy." It held instead, that circumstances
constituting an emergency existed only where the
failure to forcibly medicate a patient 'would result
in a substantial likelihood of physical harm to that
patient, other patients, or to staff members of the
institution."
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Remie v. Klein
John Rennie, a 'highly intelligent' forty year
old former pilot and flight instructor, began
exhibiting symptoms of mental illness in 1971. With
the death of his brother in 1973, his mental health
worsened and he was involuntarily admitted to Ancora
Psychiatric Hospital in New Jersey in April of that
year. He was "depressed and suicidal, and diagnosed
as a paranoid schizophrenic." Rennie was treated
with the antipsychotic drug Mellaril, and was then
released to a private facility within four days. A
' revolving door series of readmissions and releases"
ensued thereafter, and continued for a period of
approximately three and one half years, resulting in
twelve separate admissions to Ancora. Rennie's
behavior was characterized as "erratic, alternating
between depressed and suicidal to manic and
homicidal" There was a suicide attempt on December
14, 1976. Throughout this period, Rennie was
subjected to a variety of psychotropic drugs-among
them, haldol, mellaril, and prolixin decanoate.
Rennie often vacillated in taking the medication.
Often he took it without chall6nge. At other times,
he refused.
In August 1976, Rennie was once more committed
involuntarily to the Ancora facility. Throughout
1977, he was "shifted" between several medications,
including thorazine, prolixin, etrafon, haldol,
elaril, and lithium. Assaultive behavior with other
patients and hospital attendants was coupled with
further periods of delusion and suicidal outbursts.
In December 1977, the underlying events of the
lawsuit took place. By this time, the hospital staff
had grown to believe that Rennie's general condition
was deteriorating to the point where compelled
medication was essential "...to prevent plaintiff
from harming other patients, staff, and himself and
to ameliorate his delusional thinking pattern." A
hospital physician received permission from the state
Attorney-General's office to administer medication
without consent and shortly thereafter, Rennie was
forcibly administered the drug prolixin
hydrochloride, a long-acting drug requiring injection
only every two weeks. A motion for preliminary
injunction, pursuant to the Civil Rights Act was then
filed on Rennie's behalf to prohibit the
administration of drugs without his consent in non-
emergency circumstances.
The District Court found that Rennie did, in
fact, suffer from many of the side effects associated
with the use of major tranquilizing drugs. Rennie's
condition, as a result of the prolixin regimen,
included blurred vision, dry mouth, decreased blood
pressure, and akathesia (uncontrollable tremors).
The court also noted that the danger of tardive
dyskinesia was real in Rennie's case, evidenced by
preliminary symptoms including 'wormlike movements of
the tongue."
Rennie's §1983 claim asserted that the New
Jersey statutory scheme, which denied the right of an
involuntarily committed patient to refuse medication,
was unconstitutional as violative of the first,
eight, and fourteenth amendments, and the right of
privacy.
Cruel and Unusual Punishment: Though the court
assumed, arguendo. that the Supreme Court's decision
in Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977), did not
preclude the application of the eighth amendment to
persons confined in mental institutions, it found no
eighth amendment violation in the forced
administration of prolixin in Rennie's case. (In
I aham v. Wright the Court narrowed the scope of
afforded protection under the eight amendment to
exclude corporal punishment in public schools,
declaring that the ban on cruel and unusual
punishment was meant to apply only to persons who had
been convicted of criminal acts. The question of the
applicability of the eight amendment to mental
institutions was expressly reserved.) The Rennie
court's conclusion was premised primarily on its
belief that the prolixin regimen was "an integral
component of an overall treatment program," and was
therefore, "justifiably administered as treatment,
not punishment." The court distinguished the facts
in Rennie's case from those of other cases which had
found eighth amendment violations despite claims of
the therapeutic value of drug use. The court noted
that, unlike Rennie's case, each of those cases had
set forth findings that either "...the drugs were
used improperly and for punishment rather than as
part of an ongoing psychotherapeutic program," or
that the drug utilized was not recognized as
acceptable medical practice. Nor did the adverse
effects of prolixin appear to the court
"unnecessarily harsh" when balanced against the
benefits of the drug.
7he First Amendment: The court also rejected
plaintiff's contention that the first amendment
guarantee of the right to '"nentation" (freedom to
generate ideas) compelled prohibition of the non-
consensual prolixin treatment. Citing plaintiff's
expressed desire to be "cured, not warehoused," along
with testimony, first, that his ability to perform on
intelligence tests was not impaired as a result of
the treatment, and second, that any dulling of his
senses, was at most, temporary, the court
distinguished the case from Kaimowitz v. Dept. of
Mental Health. No. 73-19434-AW (Cir. Ct., Wayne
County, Mich., July 10, 1973). In Kaimowitz, a
Michigan county court held that experimental
psychosurgery could not be legally consented to by
the proposed patient, an involuntarily committed
individual confined for seventeen years under a
criminal sexual psychopath statute. Finding such
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intrusive treatment violative of both the first
amendment and the right of privacy, the Kaimowitz
court had declared:
' person's mental processes, the communication
of ideas, and the generation of ideas come within
the ambit of the First Amendment. To the extent
that the First Amendment protects the
dissemination of ideas and the expression of
thoughts, it equally must protect the
individual's right to generate ideas."
•..the court,..
underscored the need to leave the
final decision to the patient...
The Rennie court distinguished Kaimowitz, stating
that in Kaimowitz: "the effects (of proposed
psychosurgery) would be irreversible and
unpredictable, the dangers to the patient
substantial, and the benefits uncertain, with no
scientifically established therapeutic effect."
Rennie's drug regimen, the court concluded, did not
'"ise to the level" of the first amendment violations
found in Kaimowitz.
The Right of Privacy- The Rennie court did, however,
find a qualified constitutional right to refuse
psychotropic medication based on what it called the
"Emerging!' right of privacy, extending its protection
to encompass a mental patient's decision to refuse
such treatment in non-emergency circumstances. To
the court, recognition of such a right was foremost a
"practical" consideration, pointing as it did to the
greater effectiveness of a voluntary, as opposed to
involuntary, treatment program.
The court added further that balancing the
risks with the potential benefits of the treatment
was a "uniquely personal decision, which in the
absence of a strong state interest, should be free
from state coercion.' Finally, the court noted that
the uncertainty and great divergence in psychiatric
opinion in any given case underscored the need to
leave the final decision to the patient ' ather than
deferring to doctors."
Due Process: Recognizing forced medication as
involving "a major change in the conditions of
confinement," the court held that, in the absence of
emergency, some due process hearing is required prior
to the forced administration of drugs. And in its
conclusion, the court presented four factors to be
considered in an future proceedings for preliminary
injunction: 1 plaintiff's physical threat to
patients and staff at the institution, 2) plaintiff's
capacity to decide on his particular treatment, 3)
whether any less restrictive treatment exists, and 4)
the risk of permanent side effects from the proposed
treatment.
Though it refused to issue the injunction both
in the instant complaint and again on renewed motion
for preliminary injunction one month later, the court
did finally enjoing the forced administration of
psychotropic drugs in September 1979. 476 F. Supp.
1294 (D.N.J. 1979) In this class action, the court
granted injunctive relief to Rennie as well as to all
adult patients both voluntarily and involuntarily
committed to five New Jersey state hospitals. Citing
a "widespread failure" on the defendants' part to
implement the court's formerly expressed guidelines,
the court issued a new order setting forth minimum
due process guarantees and mandating compliance by
January 1980.
The essence of that order provided that in all
non-emergency situations, the hospital may not
proceed to medicate without the patient's written
formal consent. Nor is the hospital excused from
this procedure where a patient is either legally or
"functionally" incompetent. Under such
circumstances, the order requires that "patient
advocates" be notified, and an independent evaluation
made by a psychiatrist from outside the institution.
The consent form must apprise all parties of the
nature of the proposed treatment, including any
possible consequences. In' addition, the form must
state the patient's full legal rights in refusing the
proposed medication. Where the refusal is made by a
voluntary patient, either orally or by a failure to
sign the consent form, the hospital is precluded from
forcibly medicating, except in emergency situations.
Where the refusal is from an involuntary patient,
there must be an informal review by an independent
psychiatrist, prior to any forced medication, at
which the patient must be represented by a patient
advocate (or by counsel, if permitted). The patient
does not have the right to call witnesses. However,
the independent psychiatrist must "issue a written
decision- in each case, basing any decision to
override the patient's privacy right on the four
factors" set forth in the court's earlier opinions.
In addition, the court defined the context of
an 'emergency," the existence of which empowers the'
institution to forcibly medicate for a maximum of
seventy-two hours, unless the attending physician
recertifies the emergency. The court defined
'emergency' as a certified "sudden, significant
change in the patient's condition which creates
danger to the patient himself or to others in the
hospital." The court added that no medication may be
presribed "under any circumstances" where commitment
procedures have been improperly completed.
Implications for the Future
While the Rennie court adopted a limited due
process approach to the question whether there exists
a constitutional right to refuse psychotropic
medication, the Rogers court appeared content to
(continued on page twent)9
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